In this note, some of the experiences of the revised dispute setdement power during its first twelve months of operation are briefly examined. It is argued dial further reforms are needed to remove die significant discretion enjoyed by the AIRC and the Federal Court in making and enforcing dispute setdement orders.
The New Dispute Settlement Power
The 1996 amendments provide for enhanced dispute setdement powers under a revised Secdon 127 of die Workplace Relations Act. This section replaces previous provisions allowing 'bans clauses' to be inserted into awards by presidential members and full benches of the AIRC and litde-used provisions relating to the public service. Section 127 is a broad power, vested in all members of die AIRC, to issue orders prohibiting any industrial action which is occurring, direatened, impending or probable. The AIRC is empowered to make orders on its own initiadve, or on applicadon by pardes to an industrial dispute, by persons who are direedy affected or likely to be direedy affected by the industrial acdon or by organisadons widi members direedy affected or likely to be direedy affected. The AIRC is required to hear and determine an applicadon as quickly as pracdcable. Compliance with an order is expressed as a statutory obligation; and die Federal Court may grant injunedons, including interim injunedons, if it is sadsfied diat die order has been contravened or if conduct is proposed which would involve such a contravendon. The extension of die power to all members of die AIRC and its ready enforcement through Federal Court injunedons were no doubt intended to ensure dial die exercise of such powers was not confined to exceptional or unusual circumstances and so would provide an effeedve remedy against irresponsible industrial acdon (Reidi, 1996) .
Experience of the New Laws
The experience of applicadons lodged under s.127 in die first twelve mondis is mixed. On some occasions die AIRC has prompdy and effeedvely dealt widi matters before it.
But on other occasions the provision has operated unsatisfactorily.
The M obil Oil case. The first applicadon under s. 127 was made by Mobil Oil on 31 December 1996, the first day die secdon became available. The dispute related to the remobilisadon of a construction project to install a newr catalytic cracker unit at die Altona refinery in Victoria. Unions banned die project over demands diat employees previously engaged dirough anodier contractor be employed on the project. The ban prevented work on die site restarting. The orders diat die AIRC had issued in December 1996 under its previous general powers had been ignored by die unions. Nevertheless, die AIRC granted die unions a further adjournment, and hearings were ultimately conducted on 8 and 9 January 1997. Orders were issued on 17 January, but die unions ignored diem and proceedings were initiated in die Federal Court to enforce die orders. These proceedings were delayed and die Court deferred applicadons for interim injunedons in order to allow die AIRC to make further attempts to broker a compromise. Eventually, in view of the persistence of certain continuing problems, limited injunctions were granted in June 1997.
As this case shows, significant delays can occur even when major projects are held up by industrial action and when die legislation requires die AIRC to act expeditiously. The approach of the AIRC and die Federal Court demonstrates a lingering reluctance to make orders against industrial action and an apparent preference for doing so only in excepdonal circumstances or as a last resort.
The Coal & Allied cases. In early 1997, Coal & Allied, a subsidiary of Rio Tinto, attempted to use s.127 to bring about more responsible industrial behaviour and adherence to dispute setdement procedures in awards and agreements at die Hunter Valley No. 1 Coal Mine in New Soudi Wales. The Company produced evidence to demonstrate diat 14 24-hour stoppages occurred in 1996, bodi against management decisions and associated AIRC decisions and as part of national or statewide stoppages over political issues. A furdier 24-hour stoppage in breach of die dispute setdement procedure in the award occurred in January 1997, when two employees were issued diary notes for minor breaches of the Company's code of conduct. This stoppage prompted die Company to apply for an order prohibiting future industrial action inconsistent with die disputes procedure in die award. Proceedings began in January 1997, and on die unions' application were referred by die President to a full bench of die AIRC for hearing and determination. The full bench sat on six hearing days between March and May 1997, and on 20 June 1997 granted an order against industrial action in breach of die disputes procedure. The order was directed towards local industrial action in protest against, or to secure die reversal or non-implementation of, a decision made in die reasonable exercise of an available award right or managerial discretion.
The full bench made die following comments about such industrial action:
Local unprotected industrial action of die kind we have described was not comprehensively defended in Mr Kelly's (CFMEU) evidence. W e do not consider that such industrial action can reasonably be defended. Industrial reaction to disciplinary measures is not defensible or legidmate when review and grievance procedures are now so readily available. Resort to industrial action in a manner diat pays litde or no regard to disputes procedure obligadons, and in some instances to Commission directions and recommendations, is not reasonably justifiable. Such industrial action is symptomatic of a kind of industrial conflict that no longer commands a respectable place in Australian industrial relations, if it ever had one.
Where it occurs, as it has here, in an industry of national importance, a public interest is attracted in restraining furdier occurrences of such action. That is not to deny die reality and extent of die Company's private interest i T he infamous march on Parliament H ouse in August 19% accounted for two strike days, alter die employer refused to release 10 per cent o f its workforce on full pay to attend tlie rally.
in seeking to constrain disregard of the dispute settlement procedure. That relative private interest augments, but must also be balanced with, the public interest in seeking to bring about a workplace level arrangement consistent with the objects of die Act.
This approach demonstrates that the AIRC is prepared to issue orders to prevent irresponsible industrial action.
The AIRC reserved consideration of actual or probable industrial action engaged in on a national, district or Statewide basis. This decision assumed testcase proportions and has provided significant guidance as to the exercise of the AIRC's powers under s.127 by formulating a test for determining whether an order should be issued. That test evaluates the character of die industrial action for die purposes of establishing whedier, in die AIRC's view, the industrial action is illegitimate to a degree diat die commencement or continuation of it should be subject to a direction, causing it to be unlawful. In applying its discretion, die scheme of the Workplace Relations Act and die treatment of industrial action should be taken into account by die AIRC. This involves die division of industrial action into three categories:
• Protected industrial acdon: for die purposes of furthering and supporting claims made in enterprise bargaining and after complying widi statutory requirements for establishing an immunity for industrial acdon.
• Unlawful industrial action: acdon direedy contrary to a statutory provision or order of the AIRC under s. 127.
• Unprotected acdon which, although generally inconsistent with die scheme of die Workplace Reladons Act, is not automadcally unlawful but may be rendered so by an order of the AIRC.
The approach of die AIRC in reladon to nadonal statewide or district stoppages was tested in October 1997 during an extended stoppage at die same Hunter Valley coal mine as subject to die s.127 test-case decision. The unions involved in diat mine had engaged in protected industrial acdon in pursuit of a certified agreement. A six-week strike was followed in early September 1997 by anodier stoppage when further negodadons and conciliation by die AIRC failed to lead to an agreement. In response to obstruedve pickcdng aedvity, Coal & Allied sought a certificate from the AIRC permitting it to take common-law acdon against die unions. The certificate was granted and an appeal by die unions against die grandng of the certificate was dismissed by a full bench. The Construcdon, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union (CFMEU) diereupon called an immediate 72-hour stoppage (widiout consuldng die union members concerned) at approximately 40 mines in die Northern District of
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New South Wales, almost none of which had a relationship with Coal & Allied or Rio Tinto. Immediate applications were made to the AIRC for orders under s.127, and a hearing began at die same time as die stoppage began. At die conclusion of the hearing diat day, Commissioner Harrison indicated that he intended to issue orders as sought by die employers but before doing so would await die outcome of a meeting between die premier of New Soudi Wales, die unions, and Coal & Allied. W hen die matter resumed die following morning die unions indicated that diey had cut short dieir 72-hour strike and would be arranging for a return to work later that day. In die light of diat advice, die Commission decided not to issue die orders.
Non-cnforccmcnt o f orders. In two cases, Jusdce Marshall of die Federal Court declined to enforce s. 127 orders. In one case, die AIRC made an order dial die Healdi Services Union of Australia (Victoria No. 1 Branch) and its members employed by die Inner mid Eastern Healdi Care Network 'are directed to cease current bans and limitadons' and 'further directed not to engage in, commence or resume industrial acdon in connection widi die issue of market contestability'. Jusdce Marshall refused to enforce die order because in naming a branch of a union the order was referring to a legal nullity and in any event die order was too vague and uncertain to enforce. He said:
It is critical for die purposes of proceedings in die Court pursuant to Section 127(6) and (7) of die Act diat die order made by die Commission under Section 127(1) of die Act be a valid order. It is also critical diat such an order clearly identify die persons on whom it is binding and die precise conduct which it seeks to prohibit. ... A direction to cease 'current bans and limitations' leaves room for later debate as to what die extent of such bans and limitations were at die time of die order. Similarly, a direction 'not to engage in, commence or resume industrial action in connection widi the issue of market contestability' leaves room for debate as to whcdier any such action is so connected let alone 'industrial action'.
Hie second case concerned an order made against employees covered by various manufacturing awards in die face of widespread industrial action in protest at Victorian government's reforms of workers compensation. Justice Marshall found that die terms of die order did not adequately specify die relevant awards and criticised die employer representatives for seeking to have die AIRC remedy die defect in its order. Justice Marshall's decision allowed the stoppage to occur accompanied by a decision that die order made by die AIRC was invalid and unenforceable. Experiences such as diis have given rise to considerable frustration amongst employers as to die utility of seeking orders under s. 127.
Inner and Eastern Henlthcaie Network vHSUA VG619/97 (unreported 11 November 1997).
Concluding Comments
In some cases, s.127 has been shown to be capable of limiting illegitimate industrial action. By 21 November 1997, 236 applications under s.127 had been made. According to the Minister for Workplace Relations, Mr Peter Reith (1997) , most resulted in a return to work widiout an order being required; and die AIRC made only 24 orders. Given die particular circumstances involved, die issuance ol orders has been hardly surprising or controversial. But even in diese cases diere arc grounds for concern. Significant delays, die cost and inconvenience ol lengdiy litigation and die reluctance to issue and enforce orders odier dian in excepdonal circumstances sustain a pattern of imbalance widiin die Australian industrial system.
Despite die intent of die legislature, die practical application of laws can lead to different results. In one example, Deputy President Duncan in December 1997 refused to issue orders sought by Telstra even diough he found dial die industrial action concerned was not protected. The union had failed to comply widi die notice requirements for protected industrial action in circumstances where it intended to take industrial action widiout specific notice as to timing and its nature, in order to cause maximum damage to Telstra's business in die Customer Service area.
Effective remedies against irresponsible industrial action should be freely available to all businesses, regardless of dieir size and resources. Procedures should be swift and effective, and orders should be made unless diere is some clear justification for die industrial action concerned. Given die range of options available for resolving disputes, industrial action odier dian action properly in compliance widi die requirements for protected action in enterprise bargaining should rarely be considered justifiable.
Where discretions are vested in tribunals and courts and there is limited guidance in die legislation as to how die discretion is to be exercised, diere is a tendency for historically generated value judgments to influence unduly die exercise of diat discretion. Further reform is needed in diis area to ensure diat irresponsible industrial action ceases to be as prevalent as it has been at Australian workplaces.
